A Liberal Route from Homogeneity?:US Policymakers and the Liberalization of Ethnic Nationalists in Bosnia's Dayton Accords by Kennedy, James & Riga, Liliana
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Liberal Route from Homogeneity?
Citation for published version:
Kennedy, J & Riga, L 2013, 'A Liberal Route from Homogeneity?: US Policymakers and the Liberalization of
Ethnic Nationalists in Bosnia's Dayton Accords' Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol 19, no. 2, pp. 163-186.
DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2013.788910
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/13537113.2013.788910
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Kennedy, J., & Riga, L. (2013). A Liberal Route from Homogeneity?: US Policymakers and the Liberalization
of Ethnic Nationalists in Bosnia's Dayton Accords. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 19(2), 163-186.
10.1080/13537113.2013.788910
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
 1 
A liberal route from homogeneity? US policymakers and the liberalization of 
ethnic nationalists in Bosnia’s Dayton Accords  
 
This paper explores how key US policymakers’ understandings of nationalism 
contributed to core tensions in Bosnia’s Dayton Peace Accords. Drawing on in-depth 
interviews with some of Dayton’s key architects, our findings suggest that US elites 
drew on a cluster of entwined social knowledge claims about (ethnic) nationalism and 
the possibility of its liberal accommodation. US policymakers’ social knowledge was 
anchored around two key liberal beliefs: a Millian acknowledgement that territorial 
homogeneity would facilitate political stability and liberal governability, and a 
countervailing normative desire to liberalize ethnic nationalisms through the 
imposition of liberal-legalist frameworks.  
 
After several failed attempts by the US, the EU and the UN to end three years of 
vicious ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, in November 1995 the Clinton 
Administration led the Dayton Accords, a political process that ended the Bosnian 
war and designed a renewed multiethnic Bosnian state. This paper explores the central 
tension that defined these US-brokered Accords: on the one hand, to achieve liberal 
stability Dayton constituted a pragmatic, realpolitik sanctioning of the ethnically 
majoritized or homogenized regions that ethnic cleansing had created; on the other 
hand, to liberalize the new state it also contained more innovative, progressive and 
far-reaching human rights and refugee protections than had any previous peace 
agreement, indeed it set the benchmark for future agreements. This core tension, 
evident both throughout the negotiations and in Dayton’s General Framework 
Agreement (GFA) itself, was partly due to the overriding geopolitical imperative of 
ending the war (albeit after substantial hesitation), and the inevitable territorial 
compromises and constitutional concessions that this entailed.1 It also partly reflected 
the peace treaty “liberal legalism” that defined the 1990s’ decade of global 
constitutionalism, and the numerous post-conflict constitutions drafted with the help 
of US international and human rights lawyers.2 And, as one such lawyer put it: “the 
problem with all these postwar interventions [was] that the people who negotiated the 
peace were not the people who implemented them”.3 
And yet, importantly, interviews with key architects of the Dayton process and 
Accords suggest a very distinctive set of assumptions, or social knowledge of 
nationalism and of the possibility of its liberal accommodation also crucially 
underpinned US policymaker’s efforts. Put differently, how key US policymakers 
themselves theorized and understood ethnic nationalism and its claims was also 
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crucial to Dayton’s defining central tension. Indeed, we suggest that much of 
Dayton’s process and outcome was driven by a particular cluster of assumptions—
that is, US elite knowledge of nationalism—anchored around two key countervailing 
liberal beliefs or imperatives: a Millian acknowledgement that rule by co-ethnics (or 
territorial homogeneity) would facilitate political stability and liberal governability, 
and a countervailing liberal normative desire to liberalize ethnic nationalisms through 
the imposition of liberal-legalist frameworks.  
More specifically, our interview data suggests that US elites drew on the 
following cluster of entwined—if sometimes conflicting—knowledge claims 
throughout the Dayton process: a Millian notion that homogeneity (or majoritized 
regions) might make liberal arrangements work better; a strong belief that partitions 
(in practice) and collectivism (in principle) were unacceptable; an instrumentalized 
understanding of ethnicity; a belief that nationalism was a political claim more than a 
constitutive expression of identity; and a domestically-informed view that ‘liberal 
legalist’ frameworks would not only make multiethnicity possible, but that the 
creation of multiethnicity itself was a valuable aspiration.  
We present the findings in two steps. First, we find that US elites sought to 
create or affirm homogeneity—though brutally achieved—but that they did so in 
significant measure based on liberal, Millian assumptions. Specifically, we 
empirically examine their thinking in the creation of Dayton’s IEBL (Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line), or the internal border between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the 
Republika Srpska (RS). Second, we find that, once affirmed, Dayton’s architects then 
sought to temper or mitigate homogeneity by designing the possibility of using legal, 
constitutional escapes from this created or sanctioned homogeneity. We explore their 
understandings of these efforts at mitigation, and indeed at re-pluralizing Bosnia, in 
the context of the GFA’s electoral, constitutional, judicial, and human rights and 
refugee provisions.  
 
Liberalizing ethnic nationalists? 
As noted, the cluster of assumptions or knowledge claims that underpinned much US 
elite thinking throughout the Dayton process fundamentally revolved around a key 
descriptive-normative tension within liberal understandings of nationalism and its 
accommodation. This analytical tension is usefully captured in both John Stuart Mill’s 
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and Ernest Gellner’s work. As we show below, US elites operated—sometimes 
explicitly, sometimes implicitly—on a Millian recognition that greater homogeneity 
would enable the effective functioning of liberal democracy. In considering the 
relationship between nationality and liberalism, Mill famously thought that while the 
“sentiment of nationality” must not outweigh the “love of liberty”, “it is in general a 
necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should 
coincide in the main with those of nationalities”; because where this is not the case, 
“free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities 
... [since] united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative 
government, cannot exist”.4 
To be sure, Mill’s acknowledgement of homogeneity’s political virtues was 
not a normative endorsement of its attainment where is did not already easily exist. 
Here Mill recognized the practical implications of his descriptive analysis: where 
different nationality groups were so intermingled as to make separation unthinkable 
“there is no course open to them but to make a virtue of necessity, and reconcile 
themselves to living together under equal rights and laws”.5 The normative 
implication that only a homogenous culture could be compatible with liberal 
democracy was, in other words, too bleak analysis. 
A similar analysis runs through Ernest Gellner’s body of work on nationalism, 
but he captured a slightly different dimension of this descriptive-normative tension. 
Gellner’s early theorizing posited that the needs of modernity favored a 
homogenizing, territorial congruence of nation and state—a congruence often 
achieved brutally by ethnic cleansing. Gellner bluntly wrote: “in those very extensive 
parts of the globe where there is a great proliferation of cultures, there are only two 
possibilities: either … pluralism … will be achieved, or there has to be ethnic 
cleansing”.6 On the social historical record, however, the imperatives of modern, 
educated and industrial society favored—and indeed necessitated—a certain cultural 
homogeneity. 
But in his later, more prescriptive theorizing, Gellner sought a liberal escape 
from the sobering consequences implied by this earlier analysis:7 if cultures are given 
the widest possible space for social expression, he argued, under certain permissive 
conditions of modernity, and given certain political architectural designs, territorial 
homogeneity might become practically and symbolically less determinative, and 
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therefore pluralist accommodation of nationalism could be made easier and not 
require ethnic cleansing.8 So as O’Leary noted, if the nation-state is “just one political 
form amongst many capable of managing or eliminating ethnonationalist conflict, and 
if the nation-state can be structured in culturally pluralist ways (consociational, 
federal or through other forms of co-sovereignty), then the world may not be 
governed by the logic of the strong version of Gellner’s theory.”9 Like Mill, then, 
Gellner, too, understood the normative implications of his descriptive analysis of 
nationalism and hoped, therefore, that the imperative of modern development need 
not necessarily require homogeneity. 
In short, despite a Millian recognition that homogeneity is conducive to 
democratic liberalism, and a Gellnerian recognition that homogeneity conducive to 
the functioning of modern, industrial society, the pluralist accommodation of diversity 
was still considered by both theorists to be normatively desirable on liberal grounds. 
Setting aside the issue of precisely how much cultural homogeneity or unity is 
implied, a key issue, then, is how to achieve a level of shared culture after coercive 
homogenization (read ethnic cleansing)—both to protect those minorities that remain 
and to avoid a post-hoc normative endorsement of the violence.  
These theoretical lenses are useful for understanding key contradictions within 
Dayton. Indeed, our interview findings suggest that US elites worked with versions of 
these assumptions: that liberalism simultaneously required both some degree of either 
cultural or political homogeneity and also the accommodation of extant diversity. 
Their own domestic US experience told them that liberal legalist frameworks might 
liberalize ethnic nationalists and provide the basis for creating the shared political 
culture necessary for the functioning of diverse democracy. US policymakers 
considered what they were trying to accomplish at Dayton as resting squarely at the 
intersection of these two liberal imperatives. They recognized the demographic 
realities that ethnic cleansing had created: US negotiators assisted in militarily 
achieving homogeneity, they drew the IEBL between the Federation and the RS in 
meticulous detail to maximize regional homogeneity, and they sanctioned new, 
ethnically segregated municipalities—partially in a Millian recognition that political 
stability and liberal democratic institutions needed as much ethnic homogeneity as 
possible. But liberal instruments were also included in the Accords—extensive human 
rights provisions, judicial review, and refugee rights of return and restitution—as 
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attempts to find a liberal route back from the ethnic homogeneity that they had just 
sanctioned. This is how US elites themselves constructed their own efforts, and 
viewing their policies through this liberal Millian-Gellnerian lens allows us to better 
understand US policymakers’ social knowledge of nationalism and the intentions that 
underlay the Dayton process and Accords.  
 
Affirming homogeneity, or drawing ‘viable borders’ 
Less than four months before Dayton, State Department analysts concluded that 
ethnic cleansing had created a reality such that “restoring [Bosnia to] its pre-war 
demographic balance and ethnic distribution…appears virtually impossible.”10 As 
John Shattuck, then Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor, indicated it was analogous to scrambling eggs: once the eggs have been 
scrambled, there is no way to put them back, and indeed doing so “would have 
required a massive amount of social engineering, and once again it would have been 
[another] forced removal”.11 The general calculation was that Bosnia was no longer a 
conflict between ethnic groups, but a war between fully armed mini-statelets that 
could control and “cleanse” territory.12  
Considered a compromise between a just settlement and geopolitical reality,13 
therefore, US negotiators sought and encouraged ethnically viable—that is, 
homogeneous or majoritized—regions, while at the same time foreclosing the 
possibility of formal partition. This was an unwritten policy aim based on a 
commonly accepted assumption, barely articulated at the time, but explained by 
James Pardew, then Director of Balkan Task Force at the Department of Defense: 
…there’s an underlying principle here, which we never discussed, but 
it reflects the American perspective, and that is that your citizenship is 
not defined by your ethnic affiliation, your citizenship is defined by 
your residence and birthplace. And that if you do it another way, then 
there is no way to draw a line that doesn’t involve some kind of 
massive disruptive transfer of populations; this whole idea of ethnic 
exclusivity does not match with our values, so the idea that the US 
would somehow promote an agreement which would be divisive along 
ethnic lines, ripping peoples’ homes etcetera was just never considered 
seriously.14 
 
Despite this principled aversion, however, in diplomatic practice, the basic 
territorial borders that formed the predicate for Dayton’s eventual settlement were the 
cumulative product of an arc of prior agreements that not only pragmatically accepted 
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ethnicity as the organizing principle of a two-entity state, but each successive attempt 
at drawing a stable cease-fire line reflected—and diplomatically sanctioned—both the 
demographic and the territorial gains made by the aggregate effects of ethnic 
cleansing. So the base maps for the negotiations were continually adjusted in 
recognition of these evolving demographic realities.15 The refusal to partition while 
still trying to achieve as much homogeneity within the two ethnic entities, then, 
perfectly captured the Millian-Gellnerian defining descriptive-normative tension. 
Indeed this was what US policymakers meant by ‘viable borders’. 
More specifically, the basic outlines of the Dayton map were developed in 
August 1995 by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in a nine-page document 
which specified, among other things, that Dayton would be based on the Contact 
Group’s (the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia) 51-49 percent territorial split, 
respectively between the Federation and the RS; that the US would press for “more 
viable borders” to reflect ethnic realities on the ground; and that Bosnia would be a 
unitary, non-partitioned state with a single constitution and two highly autonomous 
but ethnically-majoritarian entities.16 In other words, the goals of the US negotiators 
and those of the Bosnian parties themselves were effectively the same: to give each 
group as much cohesive, ethnically homogenous, contiguous territory as possible. 
Continually updating the specific lines on the Contact Group allowed for a more 
“defensible distribution of territory”.17 That is, internal borders that captured the most 
majoritized or de-pluralized ethnic distribution might facilitate greater political and 
liberal stability. 
In practice this also involved “assisting” ethnic cleansing but for reasons of 
“liberal homogeneity”. In the months just before Dayton, the success of joint Croat-
Muslim military counter offensives (made possible by the 1994 Washington 
Agreement) meant that Federation forces (disproportionately Croat) held only 33 
percent of Bosnia’s territory, while Bosnian Serbs held nearly 70 percent.18 So the 
realities of the ethnic geography were far from the desired 51-49 split. The key 
decision, then, was whether, and how far, to allow Federation offensives to militarily 
retake Bosnian Serb controlled territory.19 US officials took a very specific—and 
contentious—decision to militarily manipulate the ethnic composition of Bosnia’s two 
constituent parts before Dayton in order to achieve the most homogenous internal 
ethnic border possible.  
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To this end, they encouraged Federation military action in some towns and 
regions; restrained it in others; and timed the call for a Dayton cease fire to coincide 
with the point where the Tudjman-led Federation forces were at their maximum reach, 
e.g. where the Croats would go no further on behalf of the Bosniaks.20 Despite Lake’s 
concerns about encouraging more bloodshed, Point Three of his peace script had been 
to get as close as possible to the 51-49 Contact Group map. So they called on 
Federation forces to release Goražde for Serb-held territory, and Holbrook 
encouraged them to take (that is, ethnically cleanse) Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and 
Sanski Most—territories that they had been previously given on the Contact Group 
map: “the map negotiations are taking place on the battlefield … and that is one of the 
reasons we have not delayed our territorial discussions. It would help matters greatly 
if these towns fell,” Holbrooke later wrote.21 This meant that certain areas were 
permissibly “cleansed” a second time: first of Croats and Muslims by Bosnian Serb 
forces, and then of Serbs as Federation forces retook territory (e.g. Jajce in central 
Bosnia).  
The glaring red light was Banja Luka: apart from the prospect of the potential 
displacement of 200-300,000 Serbs if it fell to Federation forces, Banja Luka was 
considered ethnically well within Serb territory, so it would anyway have to be given 
back to the RS in the negotiations. The decisions to allow Federation forces to retake 
territory—and then to stop them at 51-49 percent—were difficult and controversial, 
however: why stop the offensive? And why stay with 51-49 divisions?22 As James 
O’Brien, State Department lead lawyer and drafter of the GFA, noted, even 15 years 
later  
there is [still] no clear compelling answer, but … it was [mostly] a 
humanitarian concern [on our part] because the next major city [the 
Federation forces] would have taken would have been Banja Luka [and 
we were] worried about a major Serbian refugee outflow, and thus an 
even greater humanitarian emergency—and more cause for Milosevic 
to send troops across the border.23 
 
The assumption, then, was that a liberally viable internal border required a degree of 
ethnic homogeneity. Although as Shattuck noted, “it would also have been completely 
untenable if Serbia had come out the territorial winner of Dayton”.24 
In the end, while there were 109 opštine or municipalities in 1991, in which 
Bosnian Muslims were more than 50 percent in 37, Serbs were more than 50 percent 
in 32, and Croats were more than 50 percent in 14 municipalities (see the IEBL in 
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Figure 1), and while Bosnian Muslims were a plurality in more municipalities than 
were Bosnian Serbs or Croats, the IEBL effectively cut through existing opštine to 
better reflect new demographic realities—that is, to create more homogeneous 
municipalities. So new opštine were created: Dayton increased the number of 
municipalities to 142 (79 in the Bosniak-Croat Federation, 62 in the RS and one for 
Brčko). In so doing, the amended and newly created opštine were either entirely 
homogenous or largely majoritized. So the IEBL effectively furthered electoral ethnic 
gerrymandering and further de-pluralized the new state on the Millian premise that 
this might make liberal arrangements more stable. 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Original map compiled from data from Census of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991: J. Gelo, M. 
Grizelj, and A. Akrap, Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine: Narodni Sastav po Naseljima 
(Zagreb: Državni zavod za statistiku, 1995) 
Two additional, underlying knowledge claims or assumptions defined US 
policy: first, that Bosnia would not be partitioned, and second, that ethnicity and 
religion were not considered essentialized expressions of identity, but 
instrumentalized, elite-led political claims. US aversion to partition has been 
variously attributed to concerns about the wider strategic subtext of post-Soviet 
secessionism,25 to a moral aversion to breaking up states,26 or to an implicit 
commitment to liberal rights that viewed the maintenance of diversity as facilitative,27 
to fear of creating another Cyprus or Korea,28 to a more general American foreign 
policy predilection for unitary states,29 and to a generalized cautiousness about 
sanctioning secession—one also shared the UN and EU. As one key participant put it, 
international law is not a suicide club for states.30  
Early in the process, then, a decision was taken that Bosnia would not be 
partitioned. As Pardew noted, “partition was not on the table; it was not viable … 
because there is no place in the Balkans where you could draw a line and say Serbs 
here, Croats over there”:31 Accordingly, US negotiators consistently rejected 
Karadžić’s efforts to legitimize a divided Bosnia, while consistently supporting 
Bosniak Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić’s vision of a multiethnic state.32 When 
Tudjman sought a three-way territorial partition, warning of the “strategic realities” of 
drawing boundaries between the “Eastern” and “Western” worlds,33 and offering to 
trade Banja Luka for Tuzla—in effect redrawing an internationally recognized border 
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so that Zagreb and Belgrade could control, respectively, western and eastern Bosnia—
the US delegation forcefully argued the Bosniak position: this would have left “the 
Muslims in a landlocked mini-state around Sarajevo,” something the Americans 
termed “the Stalin-Hitler scenario” in reference to the division of Poland in 1939.34 
Ethnically homogenous partitioned republics would have created a Muslim state in 
the heart of Europe, so it was better to pluralize the state, and ethnicize its constituent 
parts.35  
As Shattuck understood it, partition would simply have been “an extension of 
the scrambled egg problem—to create more states [would be like] continuing to 
scramble the egg”, or to create more irredentism; so “to maintain that there were 
going to inevitably be some ethnic enclaves within the [new Bosnian] state seemed far 
more preferable”.36 “Partition has a lot of downsides once you start to pull that 
thread…you can’t draw any neat and tidy boundaries that wouldn’t leave any 
lingering issues”, Laurel Miller, assistant legal advisor to Roberts Owen, recalled. In 
fact, Roberts Owen, the lead legal advisor at Dayton and former State Department 
Legal Advisor, suggested that the governing US assumption that “a unit is better than 
a fragment” was perhaps longstanding across administrations, since the idea that 
allowing states to split into smaller fragments—especially as a result of violence or 
ethnic cleansing—was less a philosophical premise than it was a pragmatic or 
practical consideration on the part of US policymakers.37  
Yet this was not simply an American position. Gro Nystuen, legal advisor to 
EU Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bilt and author of Dayton’s 
“Human Rights Annexes”, shared this knowledge claim, though under a slightly 
different, human rights rationale: 
You should be able to solve ethnic issues without reverting to 
secession; it doesn’t really solve problems. The state being 
synonymous with its people is an old idea [and] the UN Charter sets 
very firm boundaries for state sovereignty: it’s the building brick of 
international law [otherwise] you can’t have human rights treaties and 
you can’t have implementation of human rights … Sovereignty is the 
prerequisite for being able to do anything [in terms of human rights] at 
all.38 
 
With partition excluded, then, the IEBL only mattered if it contributed to 
liberal stability: census data and “demographics decided the map”, Pardew 
recollected. It was important that it be “stable internally, and we Americans didn’t 
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care at all where that [internal] line would be, if [the Bosnians] accepted it then the 
Americans accepted it”.39 
The second knowledge claim was rooted in US understandings of the roles of 
ethnicity and religion in the Bosnian conflict. After initial wobbliness,40 they came to 
reject the idea that the Balkan peoples were destined to fight each other, or that each 
ethnicity required its own state. The governing assumption was that multiethnicity 
was possible—and desirable—not only because moments in Yugoslav history stood 
as powerful testimony of its possibility, but also because of a particular view of 
nations and nationalism among administration elites: they believed that opportunistic 
politicians (inside and outside Bosnia) instrumentally manipulated religious and 
ethnic identities for their own political ends;41 that being a Bosnian Serb was at once 
an expression of identity and a political aspiration to “run [their] own thing,” but the 
political aspiration could be decoupled from the identity claim.42  
This instrumental view of nationalism meant that not only was the conflict not 
viewed as historically inevitable or ancient, but it was also seen as almost entirely 
politically manufactured—and this crucially made it amenable to diplomatic 
engagement and responsive to military force.43 Ethnic nationalists might be 
liberalized, in other words, because ethnicity was not politics, and if under certain 
circumstances ethnicity could be violently politicized, then under different 
circumstances it could be de-politicized.  
If liberalization of ethnic nationalists precluded partition while requiring as 
much internal ethnic homogeneity within a non-partitioned framework as possible, the 
efforts at drawing the viable borders were paradoxically characterized by US 
arguments against the political significance of these internal borders: they argued that 
liberalism could make them less determinative. As Pardew recollected, when 
Milošević demanded that the tiny village of Obljaj, near Bosansko Grahovo and 
otherwise deep in Federation territory, be given to the RS because it was the 
birthplace of the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip (whose famous assassination of 
Archduke Ferdinand set off WWI), the American response was one of exasperated 
derision:44 “if you wanted to throw a room into chaos, lay a map on the table,” Pardew 
told us, “we would come in with a blank map, and they would come in with their 
experts, books, and histories; Balkan history is in the eye of the beholder, so within 
short order it devolved into name-calling and finger-pointing and red faced yelling.”45  
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But US policymakers consistently countered what they viewed as historically 
essentialist claims with liberal arguments. Bob Frasure advised Tudjman against a 
“historically deterministic” approach: “Croatia must decide if it wishes to be viewed 
as a Western nation, with Western values and respectful of democratic processes, or 
Croatia can forego such Western political, military and economic support should it 
decide to take advantage of short-term gains and carve up Bosnia based on fears of an 
Islamic state in Europe”;46 Owen used the examples of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and the Republic of Texas as metaphors for the Republika Srpska, 
arguing that the territory’s name would be insignificant in light of the broader 
liberalized federal arrangement;47 and Pardew, later the chief negotiator of the Orhid 
Agreement that created a multiethnic Macedonia, made the argument that “you can 
either be a twentieth-century European politician, or you can be a nineteenth-century 
Habsburg politician worried about territory”.48  
And yet, based on the most contentious territorial claims at Dayton (Sarajevo, 
Brčko and the Posavina Corridor, Goražde, Srebrenica, Žepa, and Bosanski Novi), 
Dayton’s lines further ethnicized the municipalities, drawing each around an 
electorally dominant ethnic majority. The Department of Defense had brought the 
most advanced digital mapping technology, together with experts who had advised on 
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border: General Wesley Clark, the US negotiating team’s military 
advisor, led a special unit of the Defense Mapping Agency to compute exact 
percentages of land using the highly classified imaging system, PowerScene, used in 
Desert Storm.49 It offered a virtual flight simulation reality, visible in three 
dimensions down to two yards, and manipulated on a joystick. While most of the 
rooms in the Dayton compound had only a few human rights and constitutional 
lawyers, the map room was regularly overflowing: Tudjman, Milošević, and 
Izetbegovic could travel across Bosnian territories and terrain in such detail, and with 
such precision, that flying through the Posovina corridor, for instance, one could see a 
barn here, and on occasion someone would say, “I know this place—my family had a 
picnic there!”50 Lines were initially manually drawn in grease pens on acetate maps 
scattered in the map room, but once these lines were transferred to the digital 
technology, the pen line represented four kilometers of territory—effectively 
changing the agreed upon 51-49 percent to 53-47.  In the end, and after the final 
agreement was signed, Clark, Pardew, and the parties’ experts went village by village, 
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hill by hill, in painstaking detail to place the fine points on the map, drawing on both 
earlier census ethnographic maps and on the new realities of ethnic displacement. As 
a result, the IEBL runs with highly meticulous precision around the borders that 
ethnic cleansing created, drawn with the most modern technology to allow the most 
accurate essentialization of territory.51  
Dayton’s map, then, was drawn on the assumption that the eventual success of 
the constitutional settlement could only rest on some prior degree of ethnically viable 
homogeneity. Effective liberalism was thought to require an uncomfortable 
essentialization of territory. While Milošević and the Bosnian Serbs saw the political 
line as becoming permanent, like Cyprus or Korea. Both the Bosnian Muslims and the 
US/EU negotiators hoped that with time, economic activity, and political liberalism, 
the IEBL would become temporary and less significant.52 Indeed policymakers 
viewed the eventual achievement of multiethnic democracy in Bosnia as normatively 
desirable: “there certainly was a norm that [US policy elites] were aspiring to. It was 
explicitly [understood] that multiethnicity was possible, and it also represented a 
rejection of the idea that there are certain populations that cannot live together and 
that therefore everyone needs their own home”.53 
So, resting squarely in the Millian-Gellnerian liberal tension, on the one hand 
US policy elites believed that territorial homogeneity—or electorally majoritized 
municipalities—would enable liberal legalist frameworks; on the other hand, they also 
hoped that imposed liberal frameworks and economic development might attenuate or 
mitigate the effects of homogeneity of their “viable borders”. 
 
Tempering homogeneity, or re-pluralizing Bosnia  
This Millian-Gellnerian tension among liberal imperatives was even more evident 
once the majoritized internal structure of Bosnia was decided and negotiated. The 
intensity of the map negotiations was contrasted by a remarkable indifference to many 
of the constitutional and nearly all of the human rights provisions American and EU 
lawyers drafted into the text to temper homogeneity—or to re-pluralize Bosnia.54 The 
inclusion of fifteen human rights treaties, the constitution’s design, electoral 
requirements, and refugee/IDP provisions were intended to mitigate the more vicious 
social implications of the ethnic map by offsetting the horizontal distribution of 
political power along ethnic lines with an individualist, human rights framework. 
 13 
Designed both to liberalize ethnic nationalisms and to provide a framework for 
multiethnic social cohesion given that territorial minorities remained, it was hoped 
that the IEBL would become less potent, the liberal provisions inserted into the 
Accords in the immediate wake of ethnic cleansing would become more robust, and 
Bosnia could eventually return to its antebellum multiethnicity.55 So broad attempts to 
find a politically liberal route back from ethnic cleansing’s homogeneity were 
included as Annexes 3, 4, 6 and 7 (respectively, electoral requirements, the 
constitution, human rights provisions and refugee rights). 
The new BiH constitution (Annex 4) embodied Dayton’s core liberal 
contradiction. Three “constituent peoples” and ethnic majoritarianism were 
constitutionally delineated: “the link between the specific ethnicities and certain 
political rights constituted an inherent part of the political compromise”.56 Because 
ethnicity and citizenship were made equivalent, the “ethnic privileges in the 
constitutional system amount to discrimination based on ethnicity”.57 The use of 
constituent peoples to refer to the three ethnicities was a hold over from the Yugoslav 
Constitution, whose six “constituent nations” (narod) each had their own republics 
(Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Muslims),58 whereas 
Yugoslavia’s non-territorial nationalities (narodnosti) included Albanians, Vlachs, 
Hungarians, and Yugoslavs (or “no ethnicity”).59 So these “Others,” or eight percent 
of Bosnia’s prewar population, were effectively erased from the constitutional 
settlement, excluded from the presidency, barred from holding office in the vetoing 
chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, and from other forms of political 
participation.  
This was recognized as a serious constitutional problem at the time of drafting, 
so to counter these ethnic exclusivities of the Constitution, the Accords’ legal drafters, 
Gro Nystuen and James O’Brien, pushed through two broad but critical provisions: 
international human rights protections and judicial supremacy.60 The first involved the 
inclusion of those rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), with the new Human Rights Chamber given extensive jurisdiction over 
general issues of discrimination. These protections against ethnic discrimination were 
extensive: “since ethnic discrimination was one of the driving forces of the war … it 
was felt that it was necessary to include a non-discrimination regime that was 
stronger than the regime laid down in the ECHR;” so the International Convention on 
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the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights were also included because of their very specific anti-
ethnic discrimination provisions.61  
But this meant that the ethnic balances adumbrated in the BiH constitution—
and deemed necessary to reach a peace agreement—would violate other constitutional 
provisions for non-discrimination and for the observation of human rights standards.62 
Because the Presidency and the House of Peoples, as components of the Constitution, 
were in structural violation of the UN conventions included elsewhere in the Accords, 
as Nystuen, one of the drafters told us, the international human rights instruments 
included in the constitutional settlement were purposely in clear violation of the very 
ethnic components on which the constitution was predicated.63  
 “Realizing that the constitution would have this problem, there was a silver 
bullet that we sort of sneaked in there, which we thought was very clever”, Nystuen 
noted:64 to partially compensate for this problem, European human rights provisions 
were given priority over all other law:65 “We kept emphasizing the primacy of 
European human rights norms over everything throughout”, O’Brien recollected. So 
Article II section 2 specified that the ECHR would have priority over BiH law.66 
Milosevic (negotiating on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs) signed up to this—“I like 
Europe”—he said, and it anyway only affected Bosnia not Serbia.67 But it was 
nevertheless a substantial relinquishment of sovereignty—something all the more 
stunning given that the architects of ethnic cleansing actually signed on to it. Bosnians 
were arguably accustomed to the language of certain human rights provisions as 
familiar elements of Yugoslav constitutions—although they were mostly constructed 
as social and collective provisions, not political ones around civil and individual 
liberties. But human rights generally were also understood and experienced in a 
political culture that in practice rarely instantiated them.68 As a result, the extensive 
human rights provisions sailed through Dayton’s signatories with little disagreement.  
The second provision pushed through by O’Brien, Nystuen, and the other 
Contact Group lawyers was that of judicial supremacy.69 Early Bosnian Serb drafts 
had not provided for a judiciary—and certainly not one that allowed for non-Serb 
adjudication over Serb-held territory with the use of arbitration as a way of bridging 
differences.70 So from the original O’Brien US draft through to the US-EU final draft 
there was provision for judicial supremacy with a single court system.  
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With these provisions, American and EU lawyers believed that they had 
inserted sufficient instruments, though inelegant from a legal standpoint,71 as Nystuen 
recognized, to render the IEBL less politically salient over time, and perhaps 
gradually transform it into something like the American states or Canadian provincial 
boundaries.72 And indeed some of these instruments were subsequently used that way. 
In 2009, for instance, through Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
European Court of Human Rights found that Bosnia was in violation of Article 14 on 
the prohibition of discrimination of the ECHR, and of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on 
the right to free elections to legislative bodies. The Court found that the Constitution 
rendered the two applicants—a Roma (Sejdić) and a Jew (Finci)—constitutionally 
ineligible to stand for election to Bosnia’s House of Peoples because they did not 
belong to Bosnia’s three “constituent peoples”, and that Bosnia violated Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 12 (on the prohibition of discrimination) because the applicants’ could 
not stand for election to the presidency.73  
In other words, the Court used the human rights provisions embedded by 
Nystuen and O’Brien at Dayton to determine that other constitutional provisions were 
discriminatory and in violation of the human rights—just as Nystuen and O’Brien had 
hoped would happen. And yet, eschewing a possibility for legal self-correction, on at 
least three occasions the Bosnian Constitutional Court declined to revisit Dayton’s 
constitutional contradiction, despite having sufficient legal tools at hand74—to the 
disappointment of O’Brien and Nystuen themselves75—concluding instead that 
differential treatment based on ethnicity remains justified in Bosnia because of the 
deep and enduring ethnic divisions of post-conflict society.  
The third and fourth set of provisions in the GFA that were designed to 
counter the map’s demographic reality of majoritized territories. Given that Dayton’s 
final map had essentially frozen the ceasefire with an estimated 2.5 million people—
of a population of 4.4 million—internally displaced, an additional 1.1 million 
refugees, and at least 42 percent of total housing stock seriously damaged,76 Dayton 
architects sought to detach both voting and return/property restitution from the 
demographic effects of ethnic cleansing, respectively through Annexes 3 and 7.77  
The electoral Annex [3, Article 4 (1)], provided for refugees and displaced 
persons to vote in their pre-war domicile municipalities based on the 1991 Census, 
either in person if they could return, or by proxy ballot.78 This annex was exceedingly 
 16 
controversial since it sought to allow postwar electoral outcomes to reflect pre-war 
ethnic demographics rather than reward coerced ethnic displacement.79 Milošević 
wanted voters to register in person in Bosnia, whereas the Bosnian Muslims wanted to 
allow absentee registration, and a vote based on the 1991 pre-war census. Indeed, had 
Annex 3 been fully implemented, it would have electorally (though not 
demographically) reversed the implications of ethnic displacement. 
Importantly, however, displaced persons were blocked, threatened, or felt too 
frightened and insecure to return to original domicile municipalities (or prewar 
homes) to vote in the crucial 1996 elections; this resulted in exceptionally low turnout 
despite Dayton’s provisions for absentee ballots.80 In both 1996 and 1997 voter 
registration interferences were widespread and OSCE failed to properly administer 
the elections.81 Under Dayton’s Annex 3, it was also possible to apply to vote in the 
municipality of currently displacement or where one would want to live in the future. 
Unsurprisingly, most displaced Bosniaks and Croats still living within the Federation 
sought to vote and register in prewar municipalities, but most Serbs displaced from 
the Federation and living in the RS sought to vote in their new, postwar 
municipality.82 OSCE noted that the contradiction was because those displaced Serbs 
in RS were often coerced into registering to vote there (as so-called “future 
municipalities”), particularly those municipalities that were formerly Bosniak 
majority: local officials in the RS conditioned humanitarian and social assistance on 
their co-ethnics’ registering in the RS, in other words, to shift electoral balances.83 
Regulations for displaced “others” allowed them to vote in current municipalities: for 
instance, in RS a residence document dated no later than 31 July 1996 had to be 
presented, thereby drastically reducing those “others” or non-coethnics who might be 
able to register in “future municipalities”.84 These tactics had the intention—and the 
effect—of creating ethnically gerrymandered municipal demographics, they 
strengthened nationalist party votes, and they ultimately placed secessionists in 
positions of authority. In the 1997 municipal elections, 80 percent voted along ethnic 
lines.85 
Similarly intentioned, Article I (1) of Annex 7 gave all refugees and displaced 
persons the “right freely to return to their homes of origin”; “to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived”; and to be “compensated for any such property 
that cannot be restored to them”.86 Dayton was the first peace treaty to make extensive 
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use of both right of return to pre-war domicile (not just country of origin) with 
provisions for property restitution—provisions now widely accepted as the basis of 
the UN’s “Pinheiro Principles” and adopted in contexts beyond Bosnia.87 As with the 
electoral provisions, the extent to which ethnic segregation or majoritized 
homogeneity could be mitigated was also related to the extent to which refugee 
returns—and particularly minority returns—could be implemented.  
Put differently, full implementation of Dayton’s return and housing provisions 
might have demographically recreated Bosnia’s pre-bellum multiethnicity. In its 
earliest implementation phases, compensation for property that could not be restored 
was linked to return; that is, if one wanted to be compensated for the destruction of 
their home, they had to return to their prewar domicile in order to make the claim. 
And there was perhaps a brief psychological moment when minority returns, or a 
slight unwinding of ethnic cleansing’s dislocating effects, could have been possible:88 
after five years of wartime deprivation, the end of hostilities initially witnessed a great 
desire to return home. But it never materialized for a number of related reasons: 
underlying trends of de-ruralization or urbanization, especially among the young; 
socioeconomic constraints; the prevalence of uncaptured war criminals and coercive 
local or municipal authorities, including most especially local police,89 which could 
make returns returns risky;90 age, class, and rurality;91 difficulties in accessing social 
welfare services and pensions; and the slow and bureaucratic pace of property 
restitution claims and housing repairs, among other factors.92  
There were also important practical differences between restitution of 
privately-owned properties and socially-owned housing: most of the privately owned 
properties were restituted in municipalities that had been demographically Serb-
dominated before the war (and most of these tended to be in rural areas); while most 
socially-owned property restitution tended to be in municipalities that were 
demographically Bosnian Muslim dominated before the war—indeed these socially-
owned urban apartments had been the most multiethnic spaces in pre-war Bosnia; for 
Croats it was more evenly split (see Figure 2). Therefore there were also underlying 
urban-rural and class dimensions to refugee and displaced person’s willingness to 
make property claims. Importantly, as Figure 2 shows, most of the areas where there 
were “no claims” were those areas bordering the IEBL in the Sarajevo suburbs where 
Serbs had fled, and in northeastern Bosnia on the RS side of the boundary line. 
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Moreover, if the majority of returns were initially those returning to places where they 
were in the majority ethnicity, with very few “minority returns”, 93 a class dimension 
to returns was also evident: middle class Serbs in Banja Luka, for instance, would 
prefer their former Croat or Bosniak middle class neighbors to their new ruralized and 
less affluent Serb neighbors; and Bosniaks in Mostar would prefer their previous Serb 
neighbors to the properties’ new rural inhabitants: peasants from Muslim villages in 
eastern Bosnia.94 
So over time, with the general failure of the return process, Dayton’s return-
based system of property restitution gradually evolved into a rights-based system of 
property restitution. Indeed, given the immediate post-war conditions, it is also 
possible that the return-based restitution provisions effectively amounted to forced 
repatriation or refoulement (e.g. a semi-forced return back into the same or similar 
conditions that caused flight in the first place), and therefore the eventual rights-based 
premise for property restitution that’s subsequently developed may in the end have 
been more consistent with voluntary repatriation.95  
 
[FIGURE 2: HERE] 
Original map compiled from data in “Housing Sector Task Force” (Sarajevo: International 
Management Group, 1999) 
 
In particular, initial difficulties in implementing Annex 7’s return and 
restitution provisions changed in 2000 with the passage of the Property 
Implementation Plan (PLIP). PLIP enforced property laws more vigorously and 
facilitated the return process, and the so-called “Bonn Powers”96 began to prioritize 
minority returns; the Office of the High Representative (OHR) began removing 
municipal and other local officials for obstructing returns (“anti-Dayton activities”); 
and PLIP “Focal Points” targeted specific municipalities with Regional Return Task 
Forces (RRTF), by running “property rights clinics”. With this, the return process 
gained momentum and repossessions of property and property rights reinstatements 
were largely completed by 2006 (see Figure 3).97 The patterns of return roughly 
correspond with those of displacement, with Bosniaks comprising the vast majority of 
returns, primarily to the Federation. Many of the returns of all ethnicities were to 
prewar municipalities, but to majoritized neighborhoods, not previous homes. A 
demographic analysis conducted just before the 1996 elections in BiH showed that 
 19 
ethnic segregation of land were most thorough and complete in the RS and the least so 
in Bosniak territories.98  
 
[FIGURE 3: HERE] 
Original map; data drawn from Minority Returns from 01/01/1996 to 31/03/2005 in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005). 
 
In summary, then, these four provisions and their attendant subtle legal 
distinctions were in some ways cursorily conceived at the time and only tenuously 
thought through,99and with the exception of the Bosniaks’ lawyer, Paul Williams, they 
were virtually ignored by the parties at Dayton. But their innovativeness and indeed 
their inclusion was made possible because, generally speaking, “human rights were 
fine, everyone loved human rights”,100 a participant told us. These far-reaching human 
rights provisions were, in the end, viewed simply as pieces of paper; unlike the map, 
which was final and real. But these provisions were also a non-coercive way of 
“rescrambling the egg”, that is, they were liberal-legalist instruments that the 
Bosnians themselves could eventually use to re-pluralize the two ethnic entities.  
These key human rights provisions, therefore, were also designed in the hope 
that over time and generations they could become robust, liberal bases for multiethnic 
realignments. As Pardew summarized much of the general thinking at the time:  
the IBEL does reflect the ethnic cleansing, the overriding purpose was 
a peace agreement, [but] it was never seen by the Americans as 
something that was going to be the defining structure and set of 
principles forever; there was an assumption here that reasonable people 
would do the right thing—when the US started we had the articles of 
Confederation and ironed it out via civil war, so we Americans always 
thought that the vision here would be EU-NATO membership, and that 
economic imperatives, jobs etcetera would take hold and that a lot of 
this really awful, hostile, vicious political stuff would go by the boards 
as new generations come along.101 
 
Several broad knowledge claims about nationalism and how to liberalize it 
underpinned these arrangements, however. First, in its totality Dayton set up a hybrid 
arrangement built on collective ethnic rights, with both integrative and ethnic 
federative elements. The ethnic exclusivities inserted into the BiH constitution were 
not American or EU preferences—in fact they resisted them—but they did reflect the 
power-sharing compromises deemed necessary to end the war. The extent to which 
US (and EU) policymakers were reluctant—and indeed despairing—at the inclusion 
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of collective ethnic or religious rights cannot be underestimated. The dilemmas, as 
they saw it, quintessentially captured the Millian-Gellnerian tension.102 The 
imperative of including collective rights “was a huge challenge to our way of 
thinking, which is that if you don’t have individual rights, you don’t have anything; 
… to have democracies you need to have individual rights”, Nystuen noted. As 
O’Brien summarized how they understood their dilemma: 
For lawyers, from a [treaty] drafting standpoint, in my mind the 
struggle was never whether to have a rights-based solution, it was 
whether it’s individual rights or collective rights; and that’s where the 
difference was … As an American lawyer, I had to accept that there 
were certain collective rights, and that felt unnatural to me because we 
don’t have them—it’s not part of the American legal framework, and 
so that was a huge thing.103 
 
In fact, Miller similarly noted that, while she would have wanted  
more of an emphasis on individual rights … we were dealing with a 
situation where what the parties themselves were used to and what they 
wanted were these collective rights, so there was a lot written into 
Dayton with us kind of holding our noses because it was very 
unappealing to have these collective rights ... which not only might 
have provided them some protection as groups, [but it] also forced 
them to have a group identity—what if you don’t want to have a group 
identity? What if your mom was one thing and your father was 
another? What if you married someone from another group? It 
excluded a lot of choice about identity in the name of protecting your 
group identity. But it was just something that we couldn’t get away 
from, it was just something recognized and recognizable to them.104  
 
Moreover, several made the point that while multiethnic democracy is itself 
hard, it is nevertheless a deeper value or ideal to fight for—and that US history itself 
provides plenty of such examples (civil war, early federations, and immigration).105 
As Derek Chollet, who served at the State Department during this period, told us, 
“there is a sense [in the US] that people can overcome differences given the right 
framework and mechanism; multiethnicity is possible because we have achieved it in 
the US … Multiethnicity … was a choice made [in Dayton’s diplomacy] and it said 
that we don’t believe that narrative of this world [the Balkans] as being about ancient 
ethnic hatreds”.106 Despite enshrining collective rights and territorial homogeneity, 
multiethnicity—or a re-pluralized, non-homogenous Bosnia—was the ultimate goal. 
This highlights the fundamental knowledge claim, suggested by the American 
experience, that because ethnicity was seen as being mutable, a liberal settlement 
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could contain centrifugal nationalist claims and thereby allow for new identities and 
assumptions to emerge. Political behavior could be altered and ethnic nationalists 
eventually liberalized. “Policymakers rejected the idea that there was something 
immutable about being a Serb or a Muslim that said that you were destined to fight 
with one another”, Chollet again,  
there was probably an aspirational part of it…there’s a certain 
arrogance in saying that they can’t [have multiethnic democracy] … 
They were actually saying ‘yes’, you can do it, and there’s nothing 
immutable about these identities. Over time with the right leaders 
we’ve learned through our own [American] experience that certain 
leaders have stoked passions while others have brought us together; so 
that’s our experience and you just have to work your way through it.107 
 
This was the liberal glue that would provide social cohesion. And yet this was 
in strained tension, as noted in the section above, with the abiding pragmatic 
calculation that homogeneity—majoritized electoral municipalities—continued to be 
a key condition for liberal stability.  
 
Conclusion 
Dayton’s GFA pragmatically recognized ethnic demographic realities on the ground 
by affirming the ethnically majoritized regions ethnic cleansing had created; and yet it 
normatively imposed a series of liberal arrangements intended to mitigate the most 
socially brutal implications of the very ethnic cleansing to which it had just 
acquiesced—to find liberal routes back from homogeneity. A key theoretical tension, 
found in both Mill’s and Gellner’s analyses of nationalism, offers a useful lens 
through which to view US policymakers’ own thinking throughout the Dayton 
process. US policymakers sought homogeneity for purposes of stability and 
liberalism, recognizing—in Millian-Gellnerian vein—that the eventual success of 
liberal institutions’ ability to accommodate diversity would rest on the greatest degree 
of baseline homogeneity possible. 
US policymakers had operated on a clear set of knowledge claims about 
nationalism: to achieve liberal stability, majoritarian regions are better than evenly 
ethnically mixed ones, but homogeneity is best; they worked on the belief that both 
partitioning and collective rights were unacceptable—and yet they acceded to both; 
ethnicity was understood in instrumental, non-essentialist, terms, with the corollary 
that nationalism was fundamentally a political claim and less an expression of 
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identity; and  finally, a view that “liberal legalist” frameworks enabled multiethnicity, 
itself an important social and political aspiration. In other words, like Mill’s and 
Gellner’s analyses, the normative implications of this liberal tenet were too sobering 
to be left unaddressed. And the difficult realities of liberalizing ethnic nationalists 
continue to be acknowledged by many of Dayton’s key architects.108  
While Dayton’s architects recognized that the new state would have a weak 
center, they nevertheless believed that it was capable of expanding its powers and that 
in a reasonable world it would have made for a real, multiethnic state.109 As Shattuck 
noted, “the best instruments we had were indeed law and human rights … [which] 
over time were likely to work, not forcing the redrawing of boundaries”. In other 
words, the limits to which ethnic cleansing could be pragmatically recognized had 
limits, and liberal imperatives at a minimum required an attempt to reverse it through 
a liberal legalism. 
Put differently, many of their knowledge claims around nationalism revolved 
around the belief that this could be an experiment in liberal diversity, in some ways 
just as the US continued to be an experiment in diversity, with a particular normative 
value placed on pluralizing and liberalizing homogeneity. As Chollet characterized it, 
Dayton’s drafters and negotiators “tried to have higher ideals to reach for”: that 
identities could change and that liberalism should contain nationalism’s identity and 
political claims.110 Indeed, Owen, who later negotiated the issue of Brčko, said that 
“what weighed most heavily on [his] mind was how to give the three ethnic groups 
equal rights but also how to get them to live together, and get used to living together 
over time. This led him to wondering what ‘ethnicity’ really was”: “[ethnicity] is 
really an artificial and sort of emotional division that has grown up, without any 
rationality at all”, he believed, “after all they did live side by side, intermarry without 
any divisions … except going to church”; in this regard he viewed himself as “an 
American lawyer with civil rights on [my] mind”.111 In this, US policymakers’ social 
knowledge of nationalism and its claims effectively treated (multiethnic) nation 
building as a policy problem involving the institutionalization of a liberal framework; 
the liberal route out of homogeneity was seen less as a identity problem, or as part of 
the substantive political task of grasping underlying power structures or modes of 
governance that characterized the former Yugoslavia. 
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